Paul S. Katz
The modifi er 'model' as in 'model organism', 'model species', or 'model animal' has become one of the most overused and under-defi ned words in all of the life sciences. Although this phraseology has been in use for over a century [1] , I will argue here that it is time that we restrict its use. My rationale is that it has come to have many different, often confl icting meanings, some of which run counter to comparative and evolutionary approaches.
The word 'model' can be used in an appropriate way, such as 'an animal model of a human disease'. In this case, it is clear that the disease itself is not being studied; rather, what is being studied either bears a likeness to the disease or involves aspects of the mechanism underlying the disease. However, stating that "I am studying a human disease in a model animal" confl ates the animal with the model. Furthermore, if the disease is actually found in the animal, it is not correct to call it a model; instead, it is the actual disease, not a model of the disease. Calling it a model could obscure species differences that might be important for applying the results to humans, as was seen with mouse 'models', where rodents and humans differ signifi cantly in their responses to infl ammatory stresses [2, 3] .
Theoretically, we could look to the major granting agencies for guidance on the proper usage of 'model organism'. The NIH provides the following defi nition: "A model organism is an animal, plant or microbe that can be used to study certain biological processes" [4] . Although concise, this defi nition means that any organism can be a model organism, making the word 'model' superfl uous. However, the NIH's actual list of model organisms for biomedical research includes only eight animal species [5], most of which are genetically or developmentally tractable, thereby creating a very narrow defi nition for 'model organism' that excludes nearly all species as well as several phyla. This defi nition is equivalent to saying that model organisms are the most widely used and most funded [6] . Finally, the NIH has a policy for sharing model organisms [7] , which suggests that such organisms have been created or modifi ed by the investigators in some way that makes them generally unavailable. Thus, even the terminology employed by the NIH is contradictory and confusing.
The NSF defi nition of 'model organism' is also problematic. A recent article on NSF's website states that "All model organisms share a few common traits: they're inexpensive, easy to care for, grow quickly and are relatively simple creatures" [8] . However, the examples given in the article include tiger salamanders, white-crowned sparrows, and European garden spiders, none of which fi t their four stated criteria of a model organism; tiger salamanders are notoriously diffi cult to breed; white-crowned sparrows are migratory and take a year to mature; and none of these species is particularly simple in a general sense. This is not to say that one cannot learn general principles of organismal structure and function from studying these animals, but why call them model organisms? Further adding to the confusion, NSF supports the development of 'emerging model organisms' in their Enabling Discovery Through Genomic Tools (EDGE) program [9] . The implication is that new genomic tools such as CRISPR/Cas9, TALENs, and viral vector-mediated transfection [10] [11] [12] will lead to additional model organisms, thereby implying that model organisms are defi ned as genetically modifi ed organisms and not by the previous four criteria. In fact, these new genomic editing techniques are leading to a revolution in life science research because potentially any organism can be modifi ed for experimental use. Once again, 'model organism' is being used to describe many different, mutually incompatible things or is simply a superfl uous descriptor.
In 1929, at a time before there were designer organisms, August My Word Krogh [13] wrote what has come to be called Krogh's principle: "For a large number of problems there will be some animal of choice or a few such animals on which it can be most conveniently studied". He went on to say that you should choose your experimental animal wisely and suggested that physiologists make friends with zoologists to explore the myriad of options available in the animal kingdom. Krogh never referred to the experimental animal subjects as models. However, there is a model that bears his name; it is a mathematical model of how capillaries supply oxygen to muscles [14] . Mathematical and computational models conform to acceptable uses of the word model because they represent systems in the real world.
The so-called classic model organisms were not described as models by their original experimentalists. Thomas Hunt Morgan, the father of Drosophila genetics, never once referred to Drosophila as a model organism in his iconic books [15, 16] . He cited the advantages of choosing Drosophila as an experimental organism, but he never used the word 'model'. After all, he was not studying a model of the mechanisms of heredity; he was studying the actual mechanism of heredity.
Sydney Brenner did not refer to Caenorhabditis elegans as a model organism in his classic work on its genetics [17] . Later, however, he did adopt the terminology; in his Nobel Prize speech, he stated, "Nature has been generous to Science and has provided us with many model systems" [18] , indicating an expansive defi nition in agreement with Krogh. In that speech, he also refers to his work on the puffer fi sh, which has a very simple genome, by saying, "Fugu is not a model organism but is rather an organism that possesses a model genome" [18] , suggesting that the meaning of model is an exemplar of a class.
Model organisms may be exemplars, but their evolutionary history needs to be considered before drawing comparisons to humans. As Dobzhansky famously wrote, "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution" [19] . Upon fi nding R650 Current Biology 26, R641-R666, July 25, 2016 © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. a similarity between humans and another species, it is often claimed that the feature is conserved from that species to humans; to paraphrase Aristotle, however, two species do not a phylogenetic comparison make. There could be several possible reasons for the similarity. One possibility is that the feature truly is conserved (that is, homologous) and would therefore be found in other species that share a recent common ancestor. Another possibility, however, is that the similarity is due to convergent evolution, in which case other species in the same clade would not necessarily share this characteristic. There seems to be a preference in the literature to say that so-called model species share homologous features with humans; but, if two animals resemble each other because of homology, one cannot distinguish the aspects that are functionally important from those that are similar simply because of a family resemblance stemming from shared ancestry. I think that if a species shares a similarity as a result of convergent evolution, it would be just as interesting, because it shows more clearly the importance of the shared feature. If evolution, in its own experimentation, came up with the same solution multiple times, one can draw a strong conclusion regarding the signifi cance of this feature. For example, the octopus vertical lobe strongly resembles the mammalian hippocampus in its organization. Although both brain structures are involved in learning, they evolved independently, showing clearly that this organization is important for the functionality of the circuits [20] .
In summary, here are my recommendations. Stop using the term model organism altogether. If an organism has been genetically modifi ed, then call it a 'genetically modifi ed organism'. If it is a natural, unmodifi ed organism, then leave out the word 'model' because it adds no information. Save the word 'model' for physical or mathematical representations of biological systems or diseases, as in 'an animal model of a disease'. Be cognizant of the phylogenetic history before claiming that any trait is conserved. Finally, here is one additional defi nition; a 'model scientist' is one who conducts experiments in the light of evolution, recognizing species differences as well as similarities as information that is critical for drawing informed conclusions. In the 19 th century, Ludwig Edinger, the father of comparative anatomy, made an error that did a great disservice to all birds. Looking at the structure of the bird brain, he noted that there was nothing that appeared analogous to the mammalian cortex. Instead, he observed tissue with a stripy appearance, similar to the basal ganglia of the mammalian brain. As the basal ganglia in mammals is involved in only instinctive, species-typical behaviour, Edinger concluded that birds were limited to simple behavioural responses. Superfi cial similarity refl ected similar function -birds were excellent pecking machines, but little else. This conclusion fi tted nicely with views of evolution at the time, which integrated Aristotle's now outdated idea of the scale naturae, or natural scale, with Darwin's new theory. Evolution was linear, with organisms ordered in a natural hierarchy of brain complexity, and so, intelligence. Humans were at the pinnacle, closest to God, and birds, thanks in part to Edinger's work, were ranked as lower in intelligence than mammals. This view persisted into the 20 th century and the phrase 'birdbrain' passed into popular culture as a mark of stupidity.
Brainy birds
How times have changed. Today we have a far more nuanced view of evolution, as a directionless, branching process that leads each species to evolve the intelligence it needs to survive in the physical and social environment it inhabits. This shift in our evolutionary thought is mirrored by the change over the last 20 years in our understanding of the avian mind. In his new book, Bird Brain: An Exploration of Avian Intelligence, Nathan Emery provides a fascinating overview of research in this area. His goal is to demonstrate that we can
